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1. INTRODUCTION
The founding of the SEAT motor company represented a watershed in the Spanish
automobile industry. Most attention has been focussed on the second half of the 20
th
century. This is hardly surprising since the industry’s development during this period took
off: after SEAT came Fasa Renault, Citroen, Peugeot, Ford, and General Motors, laying
the foundations of the present industry which is wholly controlled by the subsidiaries of
large multinationals. However the relative scarcity of vehicles before the key events of the
1950s [García Delgado, 1987, p. 170] should not blind us to some important developments
in the 1940s. Looking back at the first half of this century one can appreciate how the Civil
War splits the period. Multinational subsidiaries also dominated the market before the war,
with just a few local companies whose impact was minimal. In contrast, the immediate
post-war period saw the disappearance of General Motors Peninsular from the scene while
Ford Motor Ibérica ended the war severely weakened. From that point on and for the rest
of the early period of the Franco dictatorship, the motor industry was marked by a series
of projects (only some of which were viable) and a fascinating interplay between state and
private initiative. This marriage of convenience spawned companies whose “modus
vivendi” gives valuable insights into this period of Spanish history.
The decade of the 1940s was one of the darkest periods in the country’s history, with years
of famine, repression, general misery, and impoverishment of all aspects of national life
ranging from culture to the economy. The country experienced a severe slump [Carreras,
1989] throughout the decade. Industry, while not severely affected by the war itself,
proved incapable of taking advantage of Spain’s neutrality during the Second World War
[Catalan, 1989, 1995] and suffered a significant fall in production levels [Carreras, 1989].
Production levels, sales, and vehicle registrations revealed the virtual standstill in the sector.
The recovery did not begin until the middle of the 1950s. It was only then that the first
faltering steps were taken to modernise the economy, a process that gathered steam in the
last half of the 20
th century. However, this paper sets out to delve into the grim 40’s, which
Carreras has called “the long night of Spanish industry” [Carreras, 1984, p. 147].
Plans were made to establish a Spanish motor industry once the Civil War had come to an
end in 1939. It seemed a propitious moment for private enterprise and various foreign
motor companies presented proposals for manufacturing their entire vehicle range, from
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cars to trucks. However, the government plans were for a State monopoly, a policy which
meant that any private projects which did not contemplate the regime taking management
decisions were rejected out of hand. From 1941 onwards, any new initiative was required
to meet the plans set by INI (National Institute of Industry)
1. Virtually all vehicles in Spain
had been imported or assembled by multinational subsidiaries before the war. However,
from 1939 the new regime refused to accept assembly operations, and insisted that any
company wishing to set up factories would have to carry out the whole manufacturing
process in Spain. Naturally, the idea of achieving total autarchy was absurd, given that a
nationalisation policy of this kind needed foreign co-operation. Spanish industry on its
own simply did not have enough technological know-how to embark on vehicle
production by itself, particularly with regard to cars. On the other hand, any foreign
collaboration was expected to meet the autarchic framework set by the new fascist
government. One should not forget here that the new regime tried out autarchic policies
in the first few years of power and deliberately subordinated economic interests to military
ones in so doing.
The main argument running through this paper is that one can only understand the
development of the modern Spanish motor industry if one grasps the haggling between
motor companies and government regarding market entry and the impact of the regime’s
autarchic policies in the 1940s. Studies on the industry have generally centred, as San
Román [1995, p. 141] suggested, on the quantitative contribution made by the sector to
economic growth. Such an approach inevitably focuses on development from the 1950s
onwards and thus starts from the establishment of SEAT and Fasa-Renault. However,
work in the last decade, based on data  from the INI archives, has provided us with much
greater knowledge of the development of the motor industry in the years before the
establishment of SEAT [San Román, 1995; López Carrillo, 1996; Estapé-Triay, 1998b]. We
have already mentioned how the Civil War marked a halt to the formation of a national
motor industry based on foreign investment (mainly by Ford, General Motors and Fiat)
and the beginnings of strong State intervention [Estapé-Triay, 1997, 1998a]. This is why
studies of the industry should not be limited to the period following the inauguration of
the SEAT factory. To do so would be to ignore two decades in which the motor industry
might have developed in very different ways. Thus, although it is not our intention to
rewrite history, it is only by examining plausible alternatives that we can fully understand
what actually happened. As Ferguson [1997] puts it, the historian should not allow his
knowledge of what actually happened  to blind him to what people at the time thought4
would likely happen. To do so makes it more difficult to grasp a past reality and simply
falls into the “inevitability trap”.
Thus this paper sets out to analyse what happened in a key industry during the first decade
of the Franco regime. Once again, one can only stress the late development of the motor
industry in Spain and the fact that the country only managed to produce one modern
manufacturer of its own: SEAT. However,  one should not ignore some of the initiatives
during the first half of the century [Estapé-Triay, 1998]. This backwardness and the painful
slowness in setting up a national motor industry only tend to reinforce the grim
impression one gets of Spain in the 1940s [Fontana, 1986; García Delgado, 1987, 1989;
Catalan, 1995]. The new regime had already begun to realise the importance and need for a
strong motor industry in the period immediately following the war, although it should be
said that this appreciation was highly coloured by a military and autarchic considerations.
Particularly noteworthy among the first projects (most of them private) was SIAT [San
Román, 1995], in 1940. Despite its initially private nature, INI quickly took over the
project and overall development and manufacture of vehicles. Other projects soon
appeared on the scheme backed by Alfa Romeo, Lancia, Saurer, Hispano-Suiza, given that
truck building was another challenge and represented a more immediate need. However,
be this as it may, the most important venture was the SIAT-FIAT one for the
manufacture of cars and which sowed the seeds of SEAT
2. The first contacts between the
new fascist government and the Italians began in 1941. The purpose of this paper is to
delve into this negotiation and place it within the framework of Franco’s plans for
industrialisation on autarchic lines.
The planning and setting up of the motor industry in the years spanning 1939 to 1954 falls
into five well-defined stages. The first ran from the end of the Civil War to the setting up
of INI and was characterised by the presentation of the first private groups, the most
noteworthy being those of Bank of Urquijo Group and FIAT (SIAT). The second stage
began when INI joined the latter project, which became a joint venture by INI, FIAT, and
Urquijo. Other projects also appeared on the scene, the Alfa Romeo-INI-Hispano Suiza
one being particularly important with regard to truck making. The third stage covers the
period 1944-46 when INI was forced to break off collaboration with Italy as a result of the
war. There was a switch in priorities to truck production, with collaboration between
Hispano-Suiza and INI for this purpose. This stage came to an end with the creation of
ENASA in 1946. One should also briefly mention  a private venture – EUCORT, of5
which more will be said later. The fourth stage covers 1947-49, during which Banco
Urquijo again took up the reins of the SIAT car project. However INI once again insisted
on the need for State involvement.  Finally an agreement was signed between INI and
FIAT in 1949 which established the SEAT company. SEAT car production began in the
period 1950-1954, which also marked the post-war consolidation of the Franco regime.
There were also other initiatives such as the Fasa-Renault one and a tractor project
involving private enterprise (Motor Ibérica). In short, the first steps in establishing a
Spanish motor industry had been taken within the framework of extremely interventionist
government policies.
This paper has been organised as follows. The second section deals with the situation prior
to the outbreak of the Civil War, characterised by a slow process of adaptation to local
conditions and the domination of multinational subsidiaries, the most important of which
were Ford Motor Ibérica, General Motors Peninsular and Fiat Hispania [Estapé-Triay,
1998]. The third section deals with the body blow dealt to American subsidiaries by the
Civil War and the fascist victory. The fourth and fifth sections cover private proposals for
vehicle manufacture in which I will argue that: INI’s obsession with total control of any
kind of project; forced siting of factories in areas miles away from production centres;
sheer obstinacy in maintaining the Italian option; and interminable negotiations between
INI and private companies, all helped stifle the industry’s development for during the first
post-war decade. While it is true that the Second World War was a setback for the
incipient Spanish motor industry, it is far from being the only reason for Spain’s
backwardness at the time. I agree with San Román when she says that private initiative was
held over a barrel by the vaunting ambition of INI [San Román, 1995, p. 161]. However,
the EUCORT case does not entirely fit this general observation since the initiative
received very little in the way of official support and was ill-defined. What is certainly true
is the way in which the country was “cleansed” of foreign companies throughout the
1940s - General Motors Peninsular did not survive the Civil War, while Ford clung on until
the early 1950s, finally giving up the ghost in 1954, tired of the regime’s endless
interference with private initiative.
2. THE “NATURALISATION” OF THE MOTOR INDUSTRY, 1923-36
Local automobile production was one of the biggest problems facing the Spanish
economy in the inter-war period. Hence the search for a solution by successive
governments. State protection of the motor industry started with the passing of the6
Decree of the 9
th April 1927 in which the Primo de Rivera dictatorship set out its plan to
nationalise vehicle manufacture. This was followed by a government law which granted the
State a minimum 5% per cent stake in capital invested in vehicle manufacture. The
ineffectiveness of these provisions and the world slump forced the Berenguer government
to enact the so-called “Wais law” which raised tariff barriers on foreign vehicles, partly to
stimulate domestic production but above all to stem a flood of imports which would have
wrecked the trade balance. The Republic rescinded the law but was quickly forced to
introduce import quotas to fulfil the same objectives. Finally, the so-called “Vehicle Laws”
(Leyes del Automóvil ) were enacted on the 3
rd July and the 2
nd December 1931 and whose
purpose was to achieve 70% nationalisation of vehicle manufacture. Ford Motor Ibérica
operated under these provisions, using components produced by Spanish ancillary
industries. Other companies like General Motors and SEIDA adopted a similar policy and
enjoyed limited success
3.
The development of the industry throughout the first third of the century lagged far
behind the rest of Europe. Two reasons have traditionally been given for the weak
development of the Spanish motor industry. The first concerns the small domestic market
and purchasing power, which hampered the adoption of mass production.  Although high
quality vehicles were turned out, they were simply too expensive to compete with foreign
vehicles. The second factor was Spanish “workshop” manufacturing methods which, while
of high quality, were unable to deliver the technology and design know-how of foreign
manufacturers. The government sought to solve these problems by irreversibly
nationalising the industry and implementing an interventionist policy. The government’s
economic policy-makers believed the domestic market’s limited capacity to absorb vehicles
could be resolved by rationalising both the number of models produced and the
manufacturing system. The policy boiled down to reducing the number of factories and
concentrating production to achieve much longer production runs. The examples which
the government sought to emulate were the German and Italian industries. It was
emphasised that “the greater the reduction and simplification of models, the closer we will
get to the manufacturing systems employed in these countries and hence the cheaper
vehicles will be to produce”. Furthermore, it was considered the absence of a motor
industry in Spain would avoid the “drawbacks” of dealing with “vested interests” in
deciding the best industrial organisation for vehicle production. Manufacturing was
therefore planned according to the following scheme: a) a single factory turning out basic
cars, on the lines of the model adopted in Italy where Fiat covered the bulk of national7
demand for this type of vehicle with 1.1 and 1.5 litre “Topolino” models; and b) a sole
truck factory producing two basic goods vehicles.
In addition, technological backwardness meant collaborating with foreign companies,
which the Law of the 24
th November 1939 stipulated “shall not prejudice the legal rights of
Spanish capital invested in the company concerned”. However, it was not simply a
question of patent licensing but rather establishing collaboration on setting up a factory
and ensuring a lasting link between the foreign and Spanish company to keep abreast with
international technological developments in the motor industry. This way, the national
company could continually improve its models. This approach implied that mere assembly
operations on the lines of Ford Motor Ibérica or General Motors Peninsular would be
rejected since they did not help Spain acquire modern technological know-how. The idea
was to pay a fixed annual sum or royalties as a quid pro quo for foreign technology
transfer.
These then, were the considerations which inspired the studies which formed the basis of
the Decree of 10
th February 1940, whose provisions cut the number of factories and
models to the bare minimum and set out the terms for foreign collaboration. However,
the law did not deal with the problem of which model should be produced. Spain in
particular had a big trade deficit in cars and had to import fuel. This made it advisable to
manufacture low-consumption vehicles. It was therefore finally decided to concentrate
manufacturing in a single factory, with an initial annual production of twelve thousand cars
of less than 12 horsepower.
The pre-war Spanish motor industry had shown considerable capacity to supply vehicle
components and spares, largely thanks to the partial nationalisation mainly tried with Ford
Motor Ibérica (but also with other companies) [Estapé, 1998]. Ancillary industry supplies
chassis, wheels, coach work, electrical equipment, radiators, headlights, etc. while motors
and transmissions were built by the car factories. In other words, an attempt was made to
extend the “Ford” model of collaboration to other companies, using this as a basis for
nationalising the industry and tying in the assembly shop (supplied by ancillary industries)
with the engine and transmission factory. Basically, the Franco regime’s policy-makers
were faced with two problems, as Table 1 shows. On the one hand they wanted to build
on the experience gained in the sector to intensify assembly operations using locally
supplied components and materials. In this respect they were merely following through8
the nationalisation policies of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in the 1920s.  On the other
hand they needed to build an engine factory from scratch.
TABLE 1.  Autarchic car production plan, 1941
3. FOREIGN ENTERPRISE: FORD AND GENERAL MOTORS
Before examining the SIAT,  INI, Fiat and EUCORT cases, we should first look at Ford
and General Motors, given that these were the first companies to approach the new
regime with their projects for developing the motor industry in Spain. As has already been
mentioned, both companies, but particularly Ford, had Spanish subsidiaries which were
very active in the country before the outbreak of the Civil War. Thus Ford established its
own factories in Spain in the 1920s, an extensive sales network, and participated actively in
the partial nationalisation plan. It therefore had good reason to expect preferential
treatment from the economic leaders in the new fascist government [Estapé-Triay, 1998].
Under the aforementioned partial nationalisation plan, Ford began to increase the
proportion of Spanish materials used in its vehicles from 1932 onwards
4. The company
already used 15 million Pesetas worth of Spanish materials by 1934. Ford’s idea was to
maximise the Spanish component in it vehicles. Thus by 1936, the Spanish content of each
vehicle was at least 33% and some cases reached 50% to 60%. The growth of production
meant the company’s factory in Avenida de Icaria, (Barcelona) could no longer cope with
growth. Accordingly, Ford Ibérica’s Board of Directors held various meeting throughout
1935 and 1936. It decided to build a modern new factory in the Barcelona Free Port, thus
enabling assembly work to be carried out more cheaply and rationally than in the old
Poble Nou plant. By installing plant imported from the States they would be able to
mechanise production of more complicated vehicle parts. This would avoid having to
assemble outside the plant, an option which was simply too expensive. The total cost of
the project came to 9 million Pesetas, a figure which would be financed by ploughing back
profits. This followed the Ford policy of investing in plant and equipment in their
markets
5. The zenith of nationalisation plans was reached in May 1936 when the Ford
Board of Directors approved the building of the new factory in the Barcelona Free Port.
Negotiations with the local authorities were well under way and American architects had
arrived in the city to work on the plans. The factory was to cover 32,000 square metres
and the investment would amount to eight million Pesetas in plant and two million Pesetas
in machinery. Forecast output was 75 vehicles a day
6. The new plant was initially intended9
to cover existing Spanish demand but the possibility of further extending the factory was
not ruled out given that the site was double the built area. Ford’s objective was to
manufacture cars using almost 100% Spanish materials, in the same way as in its factories
in Germany, France, and England. This is borne out by the companies figures for Spanish
purchases, which amounted to 4.4. million Pesetas (56% of the total) in 1933 and 15.6
million Pesetas in 1935 (76% of the total) with production of roughly 3,000 and 6,600
vehicles in those two years
7, respectively. The Civil War put an abrupt end to these
expansion plans.
The company had 750 staff in June 1936 but there were 2,500 people in ancillary industries
working exclusively for Ford.  The materials and components supplied to Ford by local
industries included: tyres, inner tubes, batteries, chassis, front axles, windscreen wipers,
windows, seats,  upholstery, parts of the rear axle, motor parts, wheels, and coach work.
The continuation of this policy of promoting national production would have meant
reaching 70% local content in vehicles at the Barcelona plant by June 1938, had the Civil
War not broken out. Ford’s plans also envisaged growth in the number of vehicles
produced by other car companies in Spain. As the director of the subsidiary in his report
on the company’s activities during the Civil War noted, the firm’s policies since 1932 had
created new industries and stimulated others. Over two thousand people worked in
ancillary industries and another two thousand in Ford’s sales network. It should be recalled
that Ford Motor Ibérica was not just a factory but the nerve centre for over two hundred
strategically-sited concessionaires throughout Spain, selling vehicles and after-sales service.
The network was financially controlled by Ford, even though the company did not directly
own any of the concessionaires. Each dealer and sub-dealer had its own Ford-trained
salesmen and mechanics.
Ford did not stop making vehicles during the Civil War. It continued assembling trucks
throughout the post-war period and getting by with the sale of spares and accessories.
However, the 1935 and 1936 expansion plans were scrapped entirely. Ford Motor Ibérica
was condemned to play a lesser role during the 1940s, despite interminable negotiations
throughout the period between the subsidiary, Ford in the U.S. and England on the one
hand, and the Spanish government and INI on the other.
General Motors Peninsular fared differently. The company was wholly owned by General
Motors and had an assembly plant and warehouse in Barcelona, as well as a network of10
one hundred and fifty dealers throughout Spain. It played a less important role in the
motor industry during the inter-war period than Ford. The firm closed its Spanish plant
two days after the outbreak of the Civil War. GM’s property passed into the hands of a
workers’ committee on the 22
nd July 1936 which ordered the management off the
premises. The company’s bank accounts seized and despite protest by the management,
paid workers salaries regardless of the work done. GM’s Spanish assets fell under the
control of the Catalan Government’s “Anti-fascist Committee” on the 31
st July 1936. The
plant was put back into operation a few days later and started assembling army trucks with
the materials in the company warehouses. The company estimated losses as of 2
nd October
1936 at over 3.3. million Dollars. This figure did not include damage to the plant and
machinery. Once the stock of components ran, truck assembly ground to a halt. The
Catalan Government then converted the plant to a factory manufacturing munitions for
war ‘planes. Thus GM’s Spanish subsidiary disappeared from the scene for the duration of
the Civil War
8.
However, in May 1939, the Managing Director of GM submitted a draft project for a
factory producing cars and trucks within the framework of the Government’s national
industry protection scheme
9. The Spanish government attached various conditions. The
authorities were determined to choose a single manufacturer for the production of various
truck and car types. In the beginning it considered 30 to 40,000 vehicles as the minimum
acceptable. The regime believed the drawbacks of a monopoly would be more than offset
by the "benefits" of military organisation of production. The setting up of the monopoly
also involved applying a procrustean model of State enterprise so that all such companies
employed a similar structure covering capital, bonds, minimum guaranteed interest, and
possibly management incentives, as well as the conversion of bonds and shares once the
industry was well-established and more freedom could be given to market forces. The
company was to be run by people whom the regime trusted. Lastly, foreign investment
was considered from three points of view: (a) technical, i.e. plans, patents, staff, etc., (b)
machinery, and (c) financial (debentures and bonds). The agreements envisaged that
exports could be considered once Spanish demand had been satisfied, with the foreign
company being granted a bigger role within a new framework.
The GM representative argued that technical and/or economic reasons ruled out
manufacturing certain vehicle parts in Spain. The government replied tartly that "given the
GM representative’s statement to the effect that certain parts cannot be manufactured in
Spain for technical/economic reasons, we must point out that  factories have to
manufacture absolutely all  vehicle parts (my emphasis) in the quantities required. Reducing
the activity of certain sections or importing particular components is subject to11
government approval. The company shall put such sections into full production to
guarantee vehicles are entirely manufactured in Spain, should the government deem this in
the National Interest. It should be recalled autarchic consideration may be of greater
importance than purely economic ones". (my emphasis).  The authorities also emphasised
"the government would brook no interference in policy matters". The regime also
considered that GM has been "vague" with regard to possible sources of Spanish capital
(March had made offers) and stipulated "that the capital of these types of companies must
be wholly Spanish capital. No special capital provisions are therefore necessary and only
present an obstacle to gaining project approval".
10
4. PRIVATE INITIATIVE: SIAT-FIAT, EUCORT
SIAT
11 was the first Spanish project for setting up an automobile factory. The company
proposed manufacturing a basic vehicle already produced by FIAT and which already
satisfied most Italian demand. The car could therefore be adopted as a model for the
Spanish market. It was planned that the license would cover fifteen years. FIAT had three
factors in its favour. First, the make was well known in Spain and had built quantities
similar to those envisaged for the proposed SIAT factory. Second, the Spanish market was
similar to the Italian one, with low volume and poor consumers. Third, the fascist regime
in Italy had given FIAT a monopoly of vehicles under 12 horsepower, which was also how
things would work in Spain if SIAT were granted the concession. It boiled down to
importing the Italian system lock, stock, and barrel - a policy which the Spanish regime
considered to be in the national interest. On the technical side, it was not simply a
question of licensing patents but rather of strong technological and financial collaboration
between the Italian and Spanish companies.
The agreement between SIAT and FIAT involved the former paying the latter eight
hundred thousand dollars in gold in return for a detailed project on the human, technical,
and material resources for setting up the factory. FIAT's investment came to roughly 25%
of SIAT's 125 million Pesetas of share capital. The Italian company would also receive a
3% patent royalty on the Spanish retail price of each vehicle. However, INI raised various
objections from the outset. For example, without even questioning the 3% royalty, INI
considered the idea of incorporating a clause of this type in a contract of unlimited
duration to be unacceptable. INI considered that SIAT should take up other national and
foreign patents in addition to those offered by FIAT, and do so at the earliest opportunity.
Yet another objection raised by the Institute was that if SIAT did not make a big effort to
stimulate national ancillary industry, the vehicle venture might become little more than an
assembly operation using foreign components. INI argued that it therefore had every right12
to intervene in the development of the project, stressing that the State nature of the body
and its wide responsibilities for the Spanish economy put it in a position to “fully
appreciate the possibilities of ancillary industries at any given juncture”.
All of the private projects for vehicle manufacture involving foreign capital came to naught
during the Second World War. However, there was one local initiative which was wholly
funded by Spanish capital that actually managed to make vehicles. The company was
EUCORT, an interesting case of a genuinely private initiative operating under an autarchic
economic regime.
EUCORT was founded by Eugenio Cortés in October 1945 and was to be the only
Spanish company in the 1940s which managed to produce vehicles. The initial investment
was five million Pesetas and was used to purchase an old car repair workshop and a
bodywork shop. The technical office was set up in the latter. The aim was to sell a small
vehicle based on the German D.K.W. The company’s activity was confined to building
four prototypes in the first six months of its operation, which were then used for various
tests (which mainly consisted of taking the vehicles out for a spin on the open road). By
March 1946, the company finally had the machine tools to make certain components
available. Cortés believed that he would soon be in a position to turn out fifty wholly
Spanish vehicles a day with the machinery he already had, plus other items being
manufactured or which could be bought in the country. His target sale price was 23,000 –
25,000 Pesetas. However, his initial capital proved woefully inadequate for funding his
plans and accordingly Cortés decided to expand the share capital to 30 million Pesetas. To
do so, he needed the Ministry of Industry’s formal approval and for the project to be
classified as “in the national interest”. Cortés would thus have enjoyed preferential
treatment when it came to supplies and taxes. His hopes of obtaining all his supplies from
the Spanish market were wildly  optimistic since a study carried out by INI and FIAT
revealed that the financial and technological conditions for embarking on long production
runs simply did not exist in Spain. The lack of specialised precision machinery was just one
of the difficulties which crippled production.
Despite the meagre resources available, work at EUCORT went ahead and a limited
company was set up in August 1946
13. The firm (which had to operated under a strict
autarchic regime) had three main aims. These were to (1) achieve some kind of normality
in the supply of vehicles, at a time when imports were severely restricted; (2) increase self-13
sufficiency in high demand sectors, eventually doing away with the need to import foreign
vehicles; and (3) cover Spanish demand and export to other countries which did not have
their own motor industries, particularly those “whose race and language offered the best
openings”
14(my emphasis).
However, EUCORT’s results failed miserably to live up to the optimistic forecasts. The
vehicle had serious faults and the price was much higher than planned. Neither the
machinery used nor the production plant were up to modern standards  of vehicle
production. The company remained severely undercapitalised, particularly when it is borne
in mind that materials and labour costs alone came to over six million Pesetas  a month.
This was an extremely heavy commitment, especially when one considers the State had to
re-examine the “national interest” (which formed the basis of the concession) at the end
of just one year’s operation. It was highly unlikely that a company with a capital of just 30
million Pesetas would be able to produce vehicles worth 150 million Pesetas a year.
Accordingly, the Motor Vehicle Department of INI recommended the concession based
on “national interest” be cancelled
15. It did, however, advocate supporting the company’s
development and helping it with the supply of raw materials. The granting of a further
“national interest” classification could then be re-examined at the end of another year
16.
Despite EUCORT’s slender resources and plant shortcomings, the firm was still better
placed after its first year of operation (i.e. late 1947) than any other national vehicle
manufacturer (for example the «Nacional Sitjes» organisation). On the dark side, the firm
was still woefully equipped to undertake production in series. The truth of the matter was
that both the plant and machines used could only turn out prototypes and very short
production runs,  but not mass-produced vehicles. We do not have access to the
EUCORT files and therefore we cannot say anything about the company’s financial state
of affairs. It also impossible to guess at the company’s future since its plant provided little
more than a timid learning experience in the sector. The comparative data in Table 2 lead
one to concur with the evaluation made at the time by Wifredo Ricart of CETA (Centre
for Vehicle Technical Studies)  to the effect that the firm still had a very long way to go
before it could produce a vehicle meeting the needs of the Spanish market. Thus
EUCORT’s “national interest” classification was withdrawn, despite the country’s
desperate need for vehicles and very strong domestic demand. The firm had showed
initiative but it simply lacked the means to deliver cheap vehicles in large quantities.
Nevertheless, Ricart suggested taking advantage of EUCORT’s efforts to date to build14
taxis, which would also avoid the company getting in the way of other initiatives which he
considered more useful
17.
This brought the first period in the company’s existence to a close (spanning from mid-
1945 to the end of 1947). By the end of 1947 the company had the basic industrial plant to
manufacture vehicles on a continual basis, once it produced prototypes, carried out testing,
and set up its internal organisation and distribution network. However, it was not able to
take on mass production.
January 1948 marked the beginning of the second stage in the firm’s history. The company
began making regular deliveries of its vehicles and was thus able to start selling its products
on a serious basis. This state of affairs continued until mid-1949. The whole plant was
renewed during this period and some special machines were built, particularly automata
and virtually all the machine tools. All of the components required for die stamping had
been supplied. Despite this, the company admitted that a high percentage of its
production work continued to “use craft skills” since this was the only way it could make a
profit (almost all of which was ploughed back into improving the plant). Only two vehicles
came off the production line a day. This was due to various causes, including electricity
cuts which meant the machinery worked at only 40% capacity. The sales network
employed 22 independent dealers. The firm had sales, distribution, advertising, and
customer service departments.
EUCORT now entered its third and terminal stage. The company’s position just four years
after its foundation was a critical one. The price of its vehicles was still considerably higher
than the target set (see Table 2). EUCORT was only turning out four vehicles a day at
best, although there were hopes of reaching twenty a day within a short time.
Nevertheless, this was light years away from the production forecasts made three years
earlier. The company’s financial difficulties were the result of a wildly optimistic project for
supplying a wholly Spanish vehicle with Spanish staff and materials in a country still reeling
from the effects of the Civil War. The firm sought State aid to escape Nemesis. EUCORT
applied for State funding to help it manufacture longer production runs in June 1949.
10 All
this took place shortly before Spain finally managed to mass produce its own vehicles
18.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the company’s history. First, the firm lacked the
plant required to turn out vehicles in long production runs. It therefore resorted to craft15
methods and inappropriate technology. It needed a new factory with modern equipment if
it was to implement mass production methods. If FIAT had to manufacture 12,000
vehicles a year to make production of its larger, more powerful models economic (see
Table 2), EUCORT, as a smaller manufacturer, needed to produce more vehicles to
competitively price its products. Assuming a minimum of twelve thousand vehicles a year
had to be produced and the sales price could be reduced to 50,000 Pesetas, the company
would have needed capital of 400 – 500 million Pesetas – a far cry from EUCORT’s paltry
30 million. Table 2 shows the enormous gap between EUCORT’s ambitions and the
resources for attaining them. The company’s request for State funding was therefore
turned down. First, the then Vice-President of INI considered it inappropriate to provide
any kind of financial aid to a company which, in his words, “received permission, once in
operation, [...] to build 3,000 vehicles a year of various types [...] whereas production failed
to reach the 1,000 mark. The authorisation explicitly specified that no guarantees were
implied regarding Government measures for the protection and stimulation of the motor
industry
19. Second, continuation of EUCORT’s investment plans and authorisation of
State funding could have made it difficult to get foreign exchange to carry out the factory
project planned by INI with FIAT’s support. Thirdly, given the limitations of the Spanish
market, it had always been the policy to license manufacture of just a single national model
to achieve long production runs. The official view was that “manufacture of a EUCORT
car will therefore soon prove incompatible with production of a FIAT vehicle
20. However,
when in 1950, Cortés asked INI for 15 million Pesetas in return for winding up the
company, Planell astutely replied that EUCORT’s competition in the market would not
interfere with the Institute’s project, given the significant differences between the two
vehicles
21.
In conclusion, EUCORT took initial advantage of the strong demand for utility vehicles in
the Spanish market, being able to sell these under monopoly conditions at very high
prices. However lack of financial and technical resources constantly threatened the
company’s survival. Thus according to a bank report “Liquidity is low and the company is
poorly placed to meet all its payment obligations, particularly when large sums (mainly
covering general overheads) are involved […]. There is little general agreement concerning
the company’s founders and hence dealings with the company have always been
conducted with caution. The firm’s liquid assets have also been a weak point from the
outset. We therefore council prudence, especially where significant risks are involved”
22 It
ought to be said in EUCORT’s defence that the parlous situation in post-war Spain with16
shortage of foreign exchange, import restriction etc. would have threatened the survival of
any similar venture.
TABLE 2. Comparisons between the size of  EUCORT – planned and actual – and the SEAT
project
5. PUBLIC INITIATIVE: INI-FIAT
5.1. The war years: 1939 - 1945
Both autarchic and defence reasons lay behind the Spanish government’s dogged desire to
manufacture its own vehicles.  The first Article in the legislation which established INI
makes this objective crystal clear. Hence the Institute’s deep conviction that it had a vital
part to play in manufacturing cars. According to Suanzes, SIAT would end up being run as
a private company if INI did not get involved in the project. He considered this would not
only produce excessive dependence on what he termed “foreign elements” but also mean
the banks would play a decisive role in the company’s future thus “placing it completely
outside State control […], leaving the Government without a say in a matter which affects
our national defence and autarchy”
23
The Spanish government therefore had a very strong interest in manufacturing vehicles.
The first step was to decide what models to produce and in what volumes.
24 INI knew that
the technological maturity of the industry and large world production volumes precluded
setting up a home-grown car based on private initiative. Accordingly, it was decided to use
“national interest” to justify a strongly interventionist approach. The regime considered
that the industry’s independence could only be guaranteed by keeping it out of the
clutches of private enterprise. INI was convinced that Spanish car-making technology
(once developed) would produce vehicles which were profoundly different to American or
German products. Although Spanish car-making was heavily indebted to foreign
technology, the belief was that Spanish manufacturing would soon achieve “national
characteristics better suited to local problems (which was also the case when we drew on
Italian technology) and our models will incorporate the features we find most useful”.
However, INI realised that it would be out of the question to design similar vehicles to
those produced elsewhere in just three or four years without the help of companies like
Ford, Mercedes Benz, Alfa Romeo, Chrysler and FIAT. Nevertheless, the Institute was17
eager to begin the manufacture of vehicles at the earliest opportunity, with an immediate
start on lorries and preparation for car production within 3 – 4 years.
SIAT presented a project to the Ministry of Industry and Trade which involved setting up
an automobile firm. However, both the Ministry and INI agreed that the Institute would
take responsibility for setting up the motor industry, within the limits set by the legislation.
INI’s Board of Directors approved a major shareholding in the new Sociedad Ibérica de
Automóviles de Turismo (Spanish Car Company) in a decision taken on the 3
rd January 1942.
It was also the intention that the State should take a fair slice of the profits from the
venture. The following stakes were held in the company: SIAT: 25%; other private
companies: 15%; and the remaining 60% in INI hands
25. Once INI’s participation had
been decided, there remained the agreement terms which made the following provisions
26:
(1) FIAT would provide all the patents and the widest possible technical support; (2) FIAT
undertook to supply all the components required for manufacturing motors in Spain, and
to produce chassis in the country within four years; (3) FIAT agreed to supply 66% of the
machine tools used in Italy and draw up plans for their production in Spain; (4) It was
proposed that FIAT supply second-hand machines from their factories to cover the
remaining 33% of special tools not made in Italy; (5) The new factory would manufacture
the engine, chassis, transmission, and bodywork. Other components would be obtained
from Spanish suppliers supported by INI and (where appropriate), with the technical help
of FIAT; (6) FIAT would be remunerated for its services in the form of (a) royalties, paid
in the form of shares and (b) a fixed sum per vehicle. Staff assistance would be paid for
separately; 7) FIAT would supply up to 25% of the company’s capital, the difference
between paid up capital and royalties to be used to pay for machine tools; (8) If the
contribution of FIAT and royalties exceeded 25% of shares – “which would desirable as a
way of linking them more closely to the company”, the excess  could be paid in bonds
bearing a fixed token interest rate, which would not be additional to any interest on shares;
(9) approval was given for provisionally siting the factory in the Madrid industrial district.
FIAT in turn presented a contract which not only did not follow the scheme described
above but also varied some of the clauses of the initial SIAT project, changes which, in the
eyes of the INI Council, gravely prejudiced the interests of the Institute and did not
comply with the legal provisions concerning capital. As a result, negotiations were
suspended in August 1942 but were restarted in October when the Institute’s Technical18
Commission, headed by Nadal and Sánchez Bautista of the Vehicle Department,
interviewed representatives of FIAT at the company’s Turin headquarters.
The war obviously hindered negotiations with FIAT but, in Suanzes’ opinion “a “FIAT
has been on the stocks for over two years now and is the only option open to us under
the circumstances. It may well be that the end of hostilities will produce even greater
difficulties […] in implementing a project which is so tightly bound to concepts of
autarchy and military interest”
27 (emphasis mine).
Eleven draft contracts were presented in the period up to April 1943. The last proposal,
submitted on the 17
th April 1943, contained all of the changes requested by INI. The
Spanish negotiators considered the new proposals highly acceptable, given that FIAT was
no longer in a position to offer further trade-offs. It was therefore the moment to reach a
final decision.
In INI’s view, the motor industry “represented a symbol (underlined in the original) of a
country’s industrial development and essential to making tanks, gunboats, tractors,
machine tools, and aeroplanes. The industry’s symbolic importance and strategic
importance to national defence and autarchy make it the keystone of the Institute’s policy.
(emphasis mine)”
28 Consequently, the Council meeting of the 17
th April decided to ask the
government for final authorisation in setting up a national car factory.
29 However, Granell
and Arburúa presented various objections to the application. Granell made various
observations concerning the opportunities for building utility vehicles with FIAT. He
added that the Institute could base such a proposal on a Decree enacted in 1940, defining
government policy regarding vehicle manufacture, and on instructions received at the
beginning of 1942 from the Ministry of Trade and Industry regarding manufacture by a
company with a majority INI stake (a point referring to the old SIAT project). Granell
asked that the FIAT project be shelved, given the economic dislocation caused by the
World War and the rising cost of plant which would doubtless be reflected in higher
production costs. His argument was that offers could be obtained from other companies
once hostilities ceased and thus have a positive impact on the cost of a plant and the time
scale for executing the project. For his part, Arburúa argued that it was a bad time to start
building utility cars with FIAT. In his opinion the World War would make it difficult for
the company to meet its commitments. He also considered it easier to look for a solution19
once the war was over, when other foreign companies could provide competitive offers
(and offer better terms than FIAT).
30
In response to Granell’s and Arburúa’s observations, the then president of INI, General
Suanzes, tartly commented that if things were put off every time the going got rough, the
Institute’s work would grind to halt and be limited to little more than supervising imports
and patent licenses. He considered that “the motor industry is of paramount importance
from both military and autarchic points of view” and reiterated that “it  is pointless trying
to establish other industries of national interest producing aeroplanes, armoured vehicles,
and tractors without first setting up a car industry and an ancillary sector to serve its
needs”
31. Likewise, with regard to the FIAT patents, he argued that there were no
prospects of other companies collaborating in setting up a Spanish car industry,  besides
which FIAT was the only European company which had managed to set up in the U.S.
market. In addition, it already had experience of foreign collaboration with SIMCA in
France, which turned out 20,000 vehicles a year. Moreover, no other European company
had approached INI during the protracted negotiations with FIAT. Suanzes insisted that if
this opportunity were missed there would be no chance of building vehicles after the war.
The INI president’s position was backed  by consultants representing the military
authorities, such as Dávila, Roa and F. Ávila, who stressed the strategic importance of the
industry and its vital role as the basis for aircraft engines, tanks, etc.
32
The military situation worsened in the last third of 1944 when German forces invaded
Italy. The conflict that ensued brought the country grinding to a halt, effectively cutting
Italy off from the outside world. This stopped the FIAT project in its tracks and also
affected other ventures such as a scheme for building Alfa Romeo trucks. It also gave the
impetus to an agreement between Hispano-Suiza and INI. Given that Italy was now
effectively out of the game, the only project still in the running was Saurer’s one for
manufacturing trucks which was unfortunately too expensive to be considered a
satisfactory solution. In addition, commercial difficulties with Switzerland might be made
even worse by Germany. The latter country had repeatedly asked INI about Spanish truck
needs. It seemed the immediate solution to the problem lay with either Daimler-Benz or
MAN
33.20
The FIAT car project was therefore shelved indefinitely. The problem was now how to
build trucks and INI devoted all its efforts into this task. The result the foundation of the
ENASA company [López Carrillo, 1996].
5.2. Laying the foundations of the future Spanish motor industry, 1945-50
Making cars in Spain had long been the aim of various state and private company schemes.
One of the most important of these received the backing of the Urquijo group of
industries. Urquijo focussed its attention on the creation of the SIAT company at the end
of the Civil War. It sought technical support from FIAT for this purpose as well as from
companies either forming part of the group or with links to it (e.g. Duro-Felguera, S.E. de
Construcción Naval, Euskalduna, Basconia, S.E. de Construcciones Metálicas, Fundiciones
Bolueta, Echevarría and Hispano-Suiza). SIAT bid in the public tender for automobile
manufacture. The tendering competition was held in February 1940 but declared void for
“foreign policy” reasons. However the Ministry of Industry asked for the project to be
submitted again, this time under a “national interest” classification. However, a decision
was postponed to “allow study to be made of the co-ordination between the SIAT and
INI projects”.
At the end of the Second World War INI concentrated projects for building industrial
vehicles – trucks and tractors – in the recently established ENASA company. Just when it
seemed that the Institute had dropped the idea of manufacturing cars (1947), the Urquijo
group revived the SIAT project. This was based on four key points: (1) signing a wide-
ranging technical co-operation agreement with FIAT, with training  for Spanish staff; (2)
reorganisation and modernisation of the metallurgical and machine making industries in
the Urquijo group and associates (who would be involved in the project); (3) studying and
planning ancillary industries; and (4) obtaining the lines of credit required for importing
machinery.
Virtually a decade had passed when the old SIAT project was revived in 1947. All that was
needed was the green light from the Ministry of Industry. Once again, Urquijo was told
that the Government would only favour private initiative if it fitted in with INI’s aims. The
end result was that no authorisation was granted for isolated projects
34. Even worse, the
Banco Urquijo was told in no uncertain terms that its initiative “might awaken ambitions
in FIAT which would be best thwarted”
35. The Council of Ministers, meeting on the 24
th
July 1947, agreed to reject Urquijo’s project to manufacture utility vehicles using FIAT,21
unless INI were brought into the scheme and controlled the technical and financial side of
the business. The reasoning behind this decision was “that it is not considered fitting to
put the business exclusively in private hands given the enormous demand for vehicles in
the Spanish market”
36.
The Urquijo group was unwilling to be left out of a project which it had been working on
for almost a decade. It was therefore willing to collaborate on the terms envisaged by the
Council of Ministers, with INI and FIAT participation. However, INI considered it vital it
should hold the controlling interest, at least until the new company was up and running
and agreement could be reached on a division of responsibilities. The idea was that
Urquijo would have a minority stake in the company but would be expected to take an
active role in the running of the firm. For its part, Urquijo expected INI to grant it the
controlling interest in the company once the firm was put in the hands of private
enterprise
37.
On this understanding, the final contract between INI and FIAT was signed on the 24
th
November 1948. The venture was later to form the core of SEAT. The Italian company
began casting around for a suitable site for the new factory. There could be little doubt
about the best location. It had either to be in Northern Spain (the Basque country,
Santander, or Asturias) or Barcelona and its hinterland
38. Bilbao offered clear advantages in
Northern Spain given its well-established steel industry and a labour force which could
easily adapt to the demands of the motor industry. However, other considerations weighed
in Barcelona’s favour (mainly better communications with Italy, the advantages of siting
the factory next to Spain’s biggest Mediterranean port, skilled labour, and a good base for
building up ancillary industries). The only drawback to Barcelona was the lack of a steel-
making industry, however this could be overcome if Sagunto was used for supplying
materials. The siting issue is of particular interest because it broke with the regime’s policy
of avoiding Barcelona for purely political reasons
39. Once Barcelona had been decided on,
there was the question of where exactly the factory should be sited. At that time, the most
industrial area of Barcelona was sandwiched between the River Besòs and the districts of
Sant Andreú and Sant Adrià. However, this was ruled out for three reasons: (1) exorbitant
land prices, (2) the need for over three metres of land fill to avoid flooding from the river,
and (3) the distance to the port, which would mean transporting items through the city’s
narrow, congested streets. Accordingly, the new factory site chosen was in the Free Port22
(thus making lading and unlading operations much easier) where land was cheaper and
available in greater quantities.
6. CONCLUSION
Spain’s came out of the Civil War with its industry virtually intact. It could have taken
advantage of this to develop a motor industry. However, an interventionist and autarchic
strategy and (to a lesser extent) the Second World War led the Franco regime to allocate
resources in a singularly inefficient fashion [Tortella, 1995, p. 269, 272].
In this paper we have examined the various projects for manufacturing cars in Spain. The
Government was already strongly committed to developing the motor industry at the end
of the Civil War (1939) since it provided crucial underpinning for strategic sectors and an
autarchic economic policy. Both considerations weighed heavily with the new fascist
regime. Nevertheless, it was private initiative which first showed interest in the idea. On
the one hand, foreign multinationals, including Ford and General Motors, had assembled
vehicles in Spain during the period between the two World Wars. However, Spain’s
enthusiastic support for the Axis powers put the American companies at a clear
disadvantage. There were also local initiatives, which can be placed under two heads: those
which were purely Spanish, and those which required foreign support. The Urquijo project
backed by FIAT technology and know-how was the most important of the latter type
40.
The Urquijo group quickly saw its interests threatened  by the recently created INI. The
Institute decided to lead an automobile-making project, draw up the SIAT scheme and
begin negotiations with FIAT. The war and the invasion of Italy meant talks had to be
suspended. INI then explored other options despite this setback. The blow to the scheme
for building cars meant the truck manufacturing project was thrust to the fore. However,
these plans also relied on striking a deal with Alfa Romeo. With Italy succumbing to Allied
attacks in the South and German invasion from the North, plus fierce fighting between
fascists and partisans, Italian companies were in no state to do business with anyone.
However, there was an important difference between the car and truck projects. The
former involved setting up a new car plant whereas the second could use existing facilities
like the Hispano-Suiza factory. In fact, the Alfa Romeo project was a tripartite one
involving INI, Hispano-Suiza, and Alfa Romeo, led by W. Ricart (head of the recently
created CETA), among others. The result was ENASA, which started turning out trucks in
1946.23
After protracted negotiations between INI and FIAT, preliminary agreement was reached
in 1943, however contact between the two parties was interrupted by the aftermath of the
Italian surrender, only being resumed from 1947 onwards. The Urquijo group once again
provided the catalyst for resumption of negotiations. FIAT and Urquijo agreed a contract
in June 1947 for the manufacture of building utility  vehicles. This came as surprise to INI
which had been completely unaware of the negotiations. INI reacted by telling Urquijo
that it wanted a majority stake in any such venture. Urquijo was forced to negotiate with
INI. This was reflected in the contract struck by the former with FIAT in a clause which
stated the deal would only take effect after receiving authorisation from the Spanish
Government. This permission was denied. Finally, the contract was signed by FIAT and a
mixed company with stakes held by INI and the Urquijo group.
Thus the motor industry was established with the creation of ENASA in 1946, followed by
SEAT in 1949. The two most important sectors (basic trucks and cars, respectively) were
now covered. This only left tractor manufacture to be tackled, plus some work on
completing the truck range. This gap was bridged by Motor Ibérica (former Ford Spanish
subsidiary), in 1954.
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TABLE 1. Autarchic automobile production plan, 1941
ASSEMBLY FACTORY ENGINES FACTORY
Years Assembly with parts




First Assembly of a reduced
number of vehicles with a




Second Increased of the production
Minimum of 30% of local
parts
Building of the facilities
Third Further increased of the




Fourth Maximum of local parts Testing machinery,




Fifth Minimum production of 5.000 vehicles totally ‘national’
Source: General Secretary of Industry, 335/5, INI Archives, Madrid








Capital (PTA) 30 millions 20 millions 250 millions
Annual Production 6.000 500 12.000
Num. Employees 4.200 730 6.000
Facilities (sq.m.) n.a. 10.200 80.000
Price (PTA) 23/25.000 75/70.000 50/60.000
Source: own elaboration based on data from «Report on EUCORT» by José
Ortíz Echagüe, 3 August 1949, and «Report on EUCORT» by Jaime Nadal, 13
March 1946, 355, INI Archives, Madrid.26
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